UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-23-2013

State v. Crisp Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40633

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Crisp Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40633" (2013). Not Reported. 1254.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1254

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)

NO. 40633
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2010-14099

)

RANDALL DEAN CRISP,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE RONALD J. WILPER
District Judge

SARA 8. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 6
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Crisp's
Motion To Suppress ........................................................................................ 6
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 11
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009) ................................................................. 7
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550 (1998) ................................................................. 6
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 1991) .......................................... 8, 9, 10
State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99 (Ct. App. 2000) ..................................................... 9
State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980 (Ct. App. 2003) ........................................... 6, 10
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................... 6
Wilson v. Idaho Transportation Department, 136 Idaho 270 (Ct. App. 2001) ... 8, 9

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, fifty-three-year-old Randall Dean Crisp
pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (second conviction within
ten years). The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years
fixed, retained jurisdiction, and later placed Mr. Crisp on probation.

On appeal,

Mr. Crisp asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Karen Stoneberg, a citizen, reported to the police that she was following a
motorcycle being driven erratically in Boise.

(No. 40250 Presentence Investigation

Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 50.) 1 According to Ms. Stoneberg, the motorcycle was
weaving back and forth and from side to side, and later weaving in and out of traffic
without signaling.

(PSI, pp.2, 50.) The driver of the motorcycle circled around the

neighborhood as she followed him, and reportedly kept looking back at her. (PSI, p.50.)
She also reported that the driver's behavior was "tweaky." (PSI, p.50.) Ms. Stoneberg
indicated that she was afraid the driver would hurt someone. (PSI, pp.2, 50.)
Officers of the Boise Police Department located the motorcycle, conducted a
traffic stop, and contacted the driver, Mr. Crisp. (PSI, p.2.) The officer who initiated the
traffic stop reported that the motorcycle had been weaving back and forth in its lane.
(PSI, p.50.) The officers noted that Mr. Crisp was fidgety and spoke rapidly. (PSI, p.2.)

1

The Idaho Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the Clerk's Record and
Reporter's Transcript filed in the related appeal, No. 40250. (Limited Clerk's R., p.2.)
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Mr. Crisp told the officers that he had just purchased the motorcycle that day, and that
he had consumed one can of beer before driving.

(PSI, p.2.)

As the officers

administered standard field sobriety tests, Mr. Crisp complained that his left heel was
hurting and subsequently indicated that he had a broken toe. (PSI, p.2.) He did not
successfully complete the field sobriety tests, and the officers took him into custody.
(PSI, p.2.)

Officers found a baggie of suspected methamphetamine on his person.

(PSI, p.2.)
After Mr. Crisp was transported to the Ada County Jail, he refused to submit to a
urine sample test or DRE exam, but he provided a breath sample which gave a result of
.00/.00 BrAC. (PSI, p.2.) He also initially protested providing a blood sample, but later
complied with a blood draw.

(PSI, p.2.)

The blood sample tested positive for

amphetamines. (PSI, p.2.)
Mr. Crisp was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance,
felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), and one count of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (second conviction within ten years),
misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 18-8005(4). (No. 40250 R., pp.25-26.) Mr. Crisp
initially entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. (No. 40250 R., p.30.)
Later, Mr. Crisp filed a motion to suppress, on the basis that the police did not
have reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.

(No. 40250 R., pp.32-33.)

Mr. Crisp subsequently filed an amended motion to suppress and memorandum in
support. (No. 40250 R., pp.36-41.) The State then filed its opposition to the motion to
suppress and a brief in opposition. (No. 40250 R., pp.50-60.)
After conducting a hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress. (No.
40250 R., pp.64-65.) The district court's analysis was as follows:
2

The record speaks for itself, and it's quite - it's not a complicated
case factually.
The driver who called 911 in the first place did describe conduct
such as dipping in and out of traffic and cutting people off. So she, with
only that information, with only the behavior that she says she is
observing, she thinks that the driver of the motorcycle might be under the
influence of something.
And it's not an anonymous tip, but even if it were, given the officer's
testimony today about what he observed, I think that he had reasonable
articulable suspicion sufficient to pull the driver of the motorcycle over in
any event.
The police can't rely on a mere hunch that somebody might be
breaking the law. Their suspicion has to be reasonable based on a totality
of the circumstances, and it has to be articulable. And I think the officer
has articulated today, based on what he knew both from what dispatch
told him and from what he observed, that he did have reason to believe
that the driver of the motorcycle, Mr. Crisp, might have been under
the influence.
(No. 40250 Tr., Feb. 25, 2011, p.32, Ls.1-25.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Crisp later entered an Alford plea 2 to the
charges. (No. 40250 R., p.67.) Mr. Crisp reserved the right to appeal the denial of the
motion to suppress. (No. 40250 R., p.71.) The district court accepted Mr. Crisp's Alford
plea. (No. 40250 R., p.67.)
For the possession of a controlled substance charge, the district court imposed a
unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (No. 40250 R., pp.77-78.) The
district court retained jurisdiction for a period of 365 days. (No. 40250 R., p.78.) For the
DUI charge, the district court imposed a sentence of ninety days in jail, to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed for the possession of a controlled substance
charge. (No 40250 R., pp.78-79.) After Mr. Crisp participated in a rider program, the

2

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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district court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation for a period of seven
years. (No. 40250 R., pp.83-86.)
Mr. Crisp's counsel did not file a Notice of Appeal, and Mr. Crisp successfully
brought a post-conviction action and, thereby, restored his right to appeal. (See Limited
Clerk's R., pp.9-11.) Later, the district court entered a nune pro tune order denying the
motion to suppress. (No. 40250 R., p.93.) The same day, Mr. Crisp filed a Notice of
Appeal from the nune pro tune order denying the motion to suppress.

(No. 40250

R., pp.94-97.) After Mr. Crisp filed a Motion for Order Clarifying Jurisdiction of Supreme

Court, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed Mr. Crisp's appeal without prejudice.
(Limited Clerk's R., p.9.) The appeal was not from an appealable order or judgment.
(Limited Clerk's R., p.9.) The Idaho Supreme Court also ordered "that the district court
may re-enter the Judgment of Conviction in Ada County District Court No. CRFE 201014099, in accordance with the relief granted in Mr. Crisp's post-conviction case, Ada
County District Court No. CVPC 2012-10668, upon which a new Notice of Appeal may
be filed from that re-entered judgment." (Limited Clerk's R., p.9.)
Mr. Crisp and the State then stipulated to the entry of an order to re-enter the
judgment of conviction. (Limited Clerk's R., pp.10-11.) The district court re-entered the
judgment of conviction. (Limited Clerk's R., pp.12-14.) Mr. Crisp subsequently filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the re-entered judgment of conviction.
R., pp.16-19.)

4

(Limited Clerk's

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Crisp's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Crisp's Motion To Suppress
Mr. Crisp asserts that, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, there
was no reasonable suspicion to justify making the traffic stop. Ms. Stoneberg's tip did
not give rise to reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop, because the content of the
tip was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

Additionally, the officers' own

observations did not give rise to reasonable suspicion under the totality of the
circumstances in this case.
The standard of review of an order denying a motion to suppress is bifurcated.
"When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, [an appellate court]
defers to the findings of fact of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous."
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53 (1998). "Additionally, any implicit findings of the

trial court supported by substantial evidence should be given due deference." Id. at
553.

However, an appellate court "exercises free review over whether constitutional

requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." Id.
"A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003).

A

routine traffic stop, typically of limited scope and duration, is analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because it is more analogous to
an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.

Id.

"Under Terry, an investigative

detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." Id. Under this standard, the "totality of the circumstances then known to the
officer ... must show a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
6

person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "To meet
the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative detention must not only
be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also must be reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." Id.
"An informant's tip regarding suspected criminal activity may give rise to
reasonable suspicion when it would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that a stop was appropriate."' State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (quoting
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). "Whether a tip amounts to reasonable

suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the substance, source
and reliability of the information provided." Id. "Tips made by known citizen-informants
are presumed reliable because the informant's reputation can be assessed and, if the
informant is untruthful, he or she may be subject to criminal liability for making a false
report.

Accordingly, independent police verification of such tips is generally not

necessary."

Id. at 812 (citation omitted).

However, "under the totality of the

circumstance analysis, the content of the tip and the informant's basis of knowledge
remain relevant in determining whether the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion." Id.
While the information Ms. Stoneberg provided is deemed reliable because she
was a known citizen-informant, see Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812-13, the analysis of the
totality of the circumstances does not end with determining the reliability of the
information. Mr. Crisp submits that Ms. Stoneberg's tip did not give rise to reasonable
suspicion to make the traffic stop because the content of the tip was insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion.
Ms. Stoneberg reported that Mr. Crisp was weaving back and forth and from side
to side, that he was weaving in and out of traffic without signaling and at a high speed,
7

and that he was "cutting people off." (No. 40250 R., p.59, PSI, pp.2, 50.) However, she
also reported that he was circling around the neighborhood as she was following him.
(PSI, p.50.) Thus, "[t]he evidence adduced ... could just as easily be explained as
conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving
behavior." See State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661,664 (Ct. App. 1991). When "evaluated
against the backdrop of everyday driving experience," see id., one could reasonably
infer that Mr. Crisp engaged in the above driving behavior in response to being followed
around the neighborhood by Ms. Stoneberg.

Thus, Ms. Stoneberg's "observations

regarding [Mr. Crisp's] driving pattern failed to give rise to reasonable and articulable
suspicion that [Mr. Crisp] was driving his vehicle while under the influence" of drugs or
alcohol. See id.
Ms. Stoneberg presumably based her belief that Mr. Crisp was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol on the driving behavior she reportedly observed.

She

reported that she believed that Mr. Crisp was "drunk," "high," or "tweaking," i.e., that he
was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. (No. 40250 R., p.56; see PSI, p.50, No.
40250 Tr., Feb. 25, 2011, p.10, Ls.13-15.) However, her belief that Mr. Crisp was under
the influence of drugs or alcohol is distinguishable from the information received by the
authorities in Wilson v. Idaho Transportation Department, 136 Idaho 270 (Ct. App.
2001), where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that reasonable suspicion based on a tip
from a known citizen-informant justified a traffic stop.
In Wilson, the known citizen-informant reported that the defendant, who had
been at her home threatening other people and drinking, was "definitely drunk" before
driving off.

Wilson, 136 Idaho at 275.

The Court determined that "[a]lthough [the

informant's] report that [the defendant] was 'definitely drunk' appears conclusory, her
8

opinion was based on her observations of him and is the sort of opinion a layperson has
always been qualified and permitted to give in court." Id. The Court then concluded
that reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol
existed, and reversed the order granting the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at 276.
Conversely, Ms. Stoneberg's belief that Mr. Crisp was under the influence of
drugs or alcohol does not support reasonable suspicion. Unlike the informant in Wilson,
who saw the defendant in that case drinking at her home, 136 Idaho at 275,
Ms. Stoneberg did not actually observe Mr. Crisp drinking or using drugs (see No.
40250 R., p.56, PSI, p.50). And as discussed above, one could reasonably infer that
Mr. Crisp's driving behavior was a response to Ms. Stoneberg following him around the
neighborhood. Thus, Ms. Stoneberg's belief, based only on Mr. Crisp's "conduct falling
within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior," see
Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, was too conclusory to help establish reasonable suspicion to

make the traffic stop. 3
Further, the officers' own observations did not give rise to reasonable suspicion
under the totality of the circumstances in this case. While the police report stated that
"the bike was doing exactly the same thing that [Ms.] Stoneberg had noted," the only
detail the police report included was that it "was weaving back and forth in its lane."
(PSI, p.50.) One of the officers, Lieutenant Michael Lipple, testified at the motion to

But see State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that an officer had
reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop based on a known citizen-informant's tip that
the defendant had been knocking on her apartment door, appeared to be intoxicated,
and was leaving the scene in a pickup truck). Mr. Crisp submits that this case is
distinguishable from Larson, because the defendant's conduct in Larson could not be
explained as normal behavior. See id. at 102 (noting that the informant "was asking for
the police to come to her aid because she was frightened by an intoxicated man at her
door.") In contrast, Mr. Crisp's conduct could be explained as normal driving behavior.
See Emory, 119 Idaho at 664.
3

9

suppress hearing that the motorcycle "was going at a pretty slow speed, maybe 20
miles an hour," that it was "weaving in the lane, not maintaining the lane properly," and
that the driver "was popping the clutch, like he wasn't very familiar with riding a
motorcycle at all, or he was having a severe mechanical problem." (No. 40250 Tr., Feb.
25, 2011, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.3.)
Again, the conduct described by the officers "could just as easily be explained as
conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving
behavior." See Emory, 119 Idaho at 664.

Mr. Crisp's weaving in his lane could be

explained as part of his response to being followed around the neighborhood by
Ms. Stoneberg. And if one evaluates all the driving behavior described by Lieutenant
Lipple (driving at a slow speed, weaving in the lane, and popping the clutch) "against
the backdrop of everyday driving experience," see id., one could reasonably infer that
Mr. Crisp engaged in that conduct because he was an inexperienced motorcyclist.
Mr. Crisp's possible inexperience would not help establish reasonable suspicion to
justify making the traffic stop, because such inexperience would not in itself "justify
suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." See Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983.
In sum,

under the totality of the circumstances in this case,

neither

Ms. Stoneberg's tip nor the officers' own observations gave rise to reasonable suspicion
to justify making the traffic stop. The officers in this case did not have the requisite
reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Thus, the district court erred when it
denied Mr. Crisp's motion to suppress.

The district court's re-entered judgment of

conviction should be vacated and the order denying the motion to suppress should
be reversed.
10

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Crisp respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's re-entered judgment of conviction and reverse the order which denied his
motion to suppress.
DATED this 23 rd day of May, 2013.

,/},__"---#'" ------/2_-~· ~
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY L'<,, /

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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